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Moral foundations theory proposes that there are two types of moral domains: the individualizing domain, which relates to individual welfare (comprising harm and fairness foundations), and the binding domain, which relates to communal and spiritual welfare (comprising loyalty, authority, and purity foundations). In this investigation, we demonstrate that this distinction is not universal. Specifically, across five studies (totalN= 1,211) conducted among Jews in Israel and Christians in the United States, we show that the core religious belief that people are created in the image of God is associated not only with purity/divinity values that are typically considered to be part of the binding domain but also with the individualizing moral domain. In two correlational studies, we find that this belief is highly correlated with religiosity but that it predicts greater endorsement of the individualizing moral domain (Studies 1–2). Two experimental studies further establish that this belief is associated with endorsing the individualizing moral domain and the moral foundation of purity, but not the communal foundations (Studies 3–4). Finally, in Study 5, we demonstrate that these experimental findings are not driven by belief in God. We conclude that the distinction between individualizing and binding moral domains is more culturally contingent than previously believed. We discuss the broader implications of the belief in creation in the image of God for understanding moral judgments pertaining to human dignity. 

Do employers have a responsibility to treat their workers equally or do employees have a right to be treated equally? In common discourse, rights and responsibilities are often used as substitutable framings for the same event, but they may differentially shape judgment. In this investigation, we develop an experimental manipulation of rights versus responsibilities and evaluate whether framing an arrangement between two parties in terms of rights, versus responsibilities, affects people’s judgment. We found that people judged unequal distributions between two parties as less fair when framed in terms of rights than in terms of responsibilities. Furthermore, people judged a rights framing as fairer for an unequal (vs. equal) contractual agreement. Thus, a subtle framing manipulation can increase or decrease people’s sensitivity to unequal distributions. We discuss potential mechanisms for this effect and implications for behavioral law as well as the potential to nudge people’s sensitivity to inequality.